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Abstract 
The methodology of tests for martingale properties in return series is analyzed. Martin­
gale results obtain frequently in finance. One case is focused on here, namely, rational 
price discovery. Price discovery is the process by which a market moves towards a new 
equilibrium after a major event. It is rational if price changes cannot be predicted from 
commonly available information. The price discovery process, however, cannot be as­
sumed stationary. Hence, to avoid false inference in the presence of nonstationarities, 
event studies of field data have been advocating the use of cross-sectional information 
in the computation of test statistics. Under the martingale hypothesis, however, this 
inference strategy is shown to aclcl little except if higher moments of the return series do 
not exist. On the contrary, the cross-sectional approach may even be invalid if there is 
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the price discovery process. The time series statistic of 
Patell (1976], originally suggested in the context of i. i.d. time series but cross-sectional 
heterosceclasticity, may be preferable. It will not provide valid inference either, if higher 
serial correlation coincides with higher volatility. Unfortunately, this appears to be the 
case in the dataset which is used in the paper to illustrate the methodological issues, 
namely, transaction price changes from experiments on continuous double auctions with 
stochastic private valuaticms. 
Keywords: Price Dfacovery, .Rational Expectations, Tviartingales, Nonstationarity, Noner­
godic Central Limit Theorems, Event Studies, Experimental Economics. 
Rational Price Discovery 
In Experimental And Field Data* 
Peter Bossaerts 
1 Introduction
Let rt denote the change of the price of an asset over the period t - 1, t. One often 
conjectures that return series are a martingale relative to publicly available information, 
i.e.,
(1) 
·where :Ft-I denotes the public information set at time t - 1. The aim of this paper is to
discuss the methodology of tests of such i11artingale hypotheses. 
This will be clone in a the following context. In a market mechanism where partici­
pants meet continuously, a price adjustment process is set in motion each time a shock 
hits the market. During this process, the market searches for the new equilibrium price 
level. Indeed, price adjustment is rarely instantaneous, and the transient price discovery 
has become the focus of attention among many researchers, especially in experimental 
economics (see, e.g., Plott and Sunder [1988), Smith, Suchanek and \i\Tilliams [1988], 
Camerer and \i\Teigelt [1993], Cason and Friedman [1993] and [1994], Gjerstad [1994], 
Kagel [1994]). 
Price discovery is essentially a lea:rning process: market participants observe signals 
in the trading_process, from .which .they .attempt .to infer the likely continuation of the 
adjustment. It is also a bargaining process: participants' quotes and transactions reveal 
information, which generate subsequent trades, and, hence, transaction prices. Explicit 
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models of this learning-cmn-bargaining process can be found in Wilson [1987], Easley 
and Ledyard [1993), Friedman [1984), Gjerstacl [1994]. 
Here is a hypothesis that could be the oasis of a general empirical analysis: price 
discovery ought to be raf,ional. As mentioned before, price discovery involves learning. 
Learning can be called rational whenever the learner cannot predict where her beliefs 
will go next. If the learner starts with certain probabilistic assessments (priors) about 
the uncertainty around her, rationality requires that she apply correctly the rules of 
conditional probability (Bayes' law). If transaction prices reflect the learning of one 
specific, risk-neutral participant in the market (the marginal or representative agent), 
rationality will be reflected in absence of predictability from that participant's point of 
view. This person will refrain from speculating, because she beliefs that prices follow 
a martingale. If, in addition, the marginal agent has correct priors, it follows that 
transaction prices must not be predictable even when weighting all likely outcomes with 
their actual frequencies. In other words, if her beliefs are unbiased across repetitions of 
the market adjustment process, prin�s will be a martingale for an outside observer as 
well. Formally, one obtains the hypothesis in Eqn. (1). The assumption that priors are 
unbiased is usually referred to as ralional c:cpecta.tions. 
A test of the rationality of price discovery, Eqn. (1), seems straightforward. One 
could collect time series of returns following a particular event, and check whether they 
are serially uncorrelated. This could be clone by means of the average of future times 
past returns, which should be· zero under the null. To avoid parametric assumptions, the 
sample average is computed from a long time series, and central limit results are appealed 
to. These state that the sample average clivicled by its asymptotic standard error is 
standard normally distributed in large samples. The asymptotic standard normality of 
this z-statistic provides the basis for inference. 
The implementation of this methodology, however, is not without problems. In par­
ticular, learning drives price discovery. Learning is nonstationary, so that price discovery 
will be as well. In particular, the conditional volatility can be expected to change sys­
tematically over time as the market accumulates information about the equilibrium price 
level. One would suspect that this pose:; problems for the estimation of the asymptotic 
standard error of the rescaled sample avernge. An estimator that requires homoscedas­
ticity will almost certainly cml8e incorrect inference. Unfortunately, such ari estimator 
has been widely used in experimental studies of price discovery (Cason and Friedman 
[1993] and [1994], Gjerstad [ 1994], l\agel [ 1994]). In contrast, many event studies of field 
data have been advocating the u:;e of c·1·oss-scctional information in the estimation of the 
standard error. There are mnny example:;: e.g., the studies of return patterns following 
initial public offerings (e.g., RH .ter [1991 ]), or, studies of the adjustment process following 
dividend and earnings mmouncernents (e.g., Patell and \i\Tolfson [1984]). 
This paper evaluates the theoretical validity of cross-sectional tests of the martingale 
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hypothesis in Eqn. (1). To clarify rather abstract results from the mathematical statistics 
literature, data from a set of experiments are used. The experiments were recently held 
at Caltech, and concern continuous double auctions. Traders had private valuations that 
sometimes changed randomly from one trading round to another. Only when the private 
valuations changed, a new price discovery process was set in motion. Otherwise, price 
adjustment is absent. Hence, the experiments include a set of 'normal' trading rounds 
against which the influence of the price discovery process could be evaluated. They 
correspond to the control so:mples in the aforementioned event studies. 
The paper argues that there is little theoretical reason for a cross-sectional estimate of 
the standard error. The martingale assumption (Eqn. (1)) imposes enough structure for 
a simple time-series heteroscedasticity-adjustecl estimator to be sufficient. Adjustment 
for autocorrelation is obviously not called for. lVIost importantly, it is robust to cross­
sectional heterogeneity in the price discovery process. In particular, the conditional 
volatility patterns may be sample-dependent, i.e., volatility is nonergodic. The preferred 
statistic is the one that was originally proposed in Pat.ell [1976] in the context of i. i. d. 
return series ·with cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. 
Path dependencies are likely to arise in the context of price discovery. The evolution of 
the precision of agents' beliefs will depend on the accumulated evidence. Consequently, 
volatility is likely to be history-dependent. Likewise, price discovery in a continuous 
market is the outcome of a complex multilateral bargaining game with asymmetric in­
formation. These games are known to have multiple equilibria. The actual equilibrium 
which is played will be context-dependent (parameters, agents). Therefore, the volatility 
of transaction price changes is likely to vary from one equilibrium to another, and, hence, 
across experiments. 
One of the main aclvant<tges of' the experimental data (or, of event study data, for that 
matter) is that z-statist.i cs can be computed in several ways. Evidence for time series 
anomalies can easily be discovered when comparing the inference across the various z­
statistics. To understand this, remember that all z-statistic would generate the same 
conclusions, for instance, if the data were i. i. d. over time and in cross-section (provided, 
of course, that the samples are large enough). The experimental data clearly indicate 
that the inference differs dramatically across z-statistics. These discrepancies form the 
basis for the theoretical-statistical analysis of tests of the rationality of price discovery. 
One question obviously emerges: which way of computing the z-statistic is correct? 
A comprehensive analysis of the data reveals that even Patell 's approach is invalid. The 
data appear not to satisfy the conditions for asymptotic normality of Patell's statistic, 
outlined in Hall [ 1977]. In particular. there is strong evidence that serial correlation 
increases whenenever volatility is higher, in vio]a.tion of one of Hall's most crucial as­
sumptions. 
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This paper complements Bossaerts [1995), where the actual large-sample distribution 
of simple statistics is derived in the context of twc) models of price adjustment.1 The
asymptotic distributions are nonstandard. They are those of functionals of Brownian 
motions. The present paper illustrates the concerns of Bossaerts [1995], not by means 
of theoretical examples, but using experimental data. For the purpose of this paper, 
Bossaerts [1995) should therefore be viewed as providing a theoretical basis for the lack 
of stationarity and ergodicity in price discovery, which will be documented here to be 
actually present in experimental data. 
Bossaerts [1995) ancl the present paper complement .each other in another respect.
In the former, the statistics are fixed beforehand, and the actual large-sample behav­
ior is derived. Here, we attempt to alter the statistics in order to obtain asymptotic 
standard normality. Jn other words, we attempt to find the statistic that is robust to 
nonstationarities and even nonergodicities in the data. 
The next section presents the experiments with which the paper illustrates the theoretical­
statistical arguments. Section 3 isolates a control sample, where no price adjustment 
takes place. The striking differences in serial correlation bet;ween the control sample and 
the remaining sample motivates the theoretical-statistical analysis. Section 4 discusses 
a general martingale central limit theorem that is to form a robust basis for further in­
ference. Section 5 elaborates on and illustrates two implementations of this martingale 
invariance result. Section 6 explores the causes behind the discrepancies between the 
results from different implementation strategies. Section 7 concludes. 
2 The Experin1ents
vVe study five experiments that Charles Plott recently ran at the California Institute 
of Technology. The ai1i1 was to study rational expectations equilibria in continuous 
double auctions with stochastic private valuations. The experiments are a large-scale 
replication of the experinwnts reported in Plott and Agha [1983). They consist of pairs 
of trading rounds. 111 the first trading round, trade takes place under certainty, i.e., the 
distribution of private valuations is known. In the second trading rnund, some uncertainty 
is introduced, in the form of st.oc:hastic private valuations for agents on the demand side. 
Traders are given the oppmtnnit.y t.o carry over inventory between two periods in a pair. 
The experiments generally Inst.eel twenty periods (ten pairs of two trading rounds). We 
shall ignore the first couple, as t.hese were practice runs designed to familiarize subjects 
with the computer software. Pmticipantt> were not paid during the practice rounds. They 
1 Bossaerts [1905] focuses only on ti 1e learning aspect of price discovery, ingnoring the strategic issues, 
which form the core of the a11alys!�s of' Wibo11 [1987] and Easley and Ledyard [1993]. 
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were paid, however, during the remainder of the experiment. The pay depended on their 
trading performance. 
V./e shall look at transaction prices only, and, in particular, their serial correlation 
patterns. Table 1 lists simple first-order autocorrelation coefficients, as well as the cor­
responding z-statistics computed by rescaling (multiplying) the sample autocorr;elation 
coefficients with the square root of the time S(�ries length, and denoted Ztsh·2 Only intra­
trading-round transaction price changes are usecl. 
The amount of negative se'T'ial correlation is striking. It confirms the results of other 
experiments on continuous double auctions with stochastic private valuations (Cason 
and Friedman [1993] and [1094], Gjerstacl [1994], Kagel [1994]). One should be careful, 
however, not to draw too quickly the conclusion that price adjustment in experimental 
markets is irrational. From studies of field clata, we know that negative serial correlation 
will emerge if the minimum tick size puts a lower bound on the bid ask spread and if 
the volatility of transaction price changes is low (see Roll [1984]; for evidence, see, e.g., 
Patell and \iVolfson [1984]). 3 In the experiments, the tick size is very low (less than 
0.5% of the equilibrium price level), but the volatility decreases dramatically as prices 
reach the equilibrium level or in the first of each pair of trading round, where there is no 
uncertainty about the distribution of private valuations. Figure 1 illustrates this: it plots 
transaction price changes in transact.ion time (as opposed to calendar time) for one of 
the experiments. The intra-tniding-rcnmd transaction prices were concatenated to obtain 
one long time series. 
There may be an additional cause for spurious negative serial correlation in transac­
tion price changes. In tl1e experiments, private valuations lie on a discrete grid. Once 
infra-marginal units have changed hands, an artificially high bid-ask spread would emerge 
merely as a result of this discrete gricl. Of conrse, there is still the issue that no transac­
tions should take place anymore once infra-marginal units have traded. In .other words, 
the artificially high bicl-ask spread ought not to show up in transaction price changes. 
In any event, to remedy the problem of potentiaJly spurious negative serial correlation, 
one could look at only one type of transactions, namely accepted asks (one could also 
investigate the other sicle, namely, of accepted bids; the conclusions do not differ). These 
cannot possibly be affect.eel by spurious autocorrelation because of bid-ask bouncing. 
Table 2 lists serial conelnt.ion properties of accepted asks in the five experiments. The 
2Actually, the z-stntistic is co1 1 1p11ted i11 a slightly different wny. It is based on a sample autocorrela­
tion coefficient for whid1 11 eitlier t11 1 cm•aria11cc (in tlw 11 urnerator) nor the variances (in the denominator) 
are adjusted for the mean. Under tlw n1 1ll of Eqn. ( 1 ) , this is allowed. Adjustment for the mean has no 
qualitative effect on the results. 
3 An explicit relation bet\\'een serial correlation a11d the bid-ask spread is given in Roll [1984]. Harris
[1994] provides an in-depth analysi8 of the eco11omic effect (volume, quotation size, etc.) of minimum 
tick size. 
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picture is different. Highly significant negative autocorrelation continues to appear in the 
majority of the experiments, but a significantly positive serial correlation shows up for 
the fourth experiment. The uniformity in the pattern of autocorrelations of transaction 
price changes is broken. 
3 Introducing Control Samples
As mentioned before, the experiments consist of pairs of trading rounds. In the first one, 
there is no uncertainty about private valuations. Price discovery ought to be absent. In 
the second trnding round, private valuations on the demand side are stochastic. Hence, 
price discovery should be apparent. A comparison of trnnsaction price patterns across the 
two types of trading rmmds should reveal something; about the effect of price discovery. 
To verify this, let us split the samples in two parts: one were we concatenate price changes 
from the first hading rounds in each pair, and a second part, where price changes from 
the second trnding rounds are linked together to form one long series. \Ve shall refer to 
the first series as the "control sample". The second series will be called the "adjustment 
sample." 
Table 2 reports autocorrelation coefficients and corresponding z-statistics for the two 
samples. There is a pronounced difference. In only one experiment can one find significant 
(negative) serial correlation in the control sample. In contrast, significance emerges in all 
but one adjustment sample. The difference in the serial correlation patterns between the 
control and adjustment sarnples is striking. The significant autocorrelation coefficients 
in the adjustment. sarnple i11dicaLe LhaL price discovery is far from rational. 
But is this really the ccmdusio11 we shoul cl draw? The statistical properties of the 
adjustment sample may differ in many respects, to the point that the z-statistics are 
not standard normal anymore, invalidating our inference. There is one feature of price 
discovery which leads us to suspect that this is the case, namely nonstationarity. 
4 A Martingale Central Lin1it Theoren1
Price discovery is predominantly a. learning; phenomenon: traders accumulate information 
about other agents' private valuations and about the equilibrium price level. The cumu­
lation of the information over time is likely to induce nonstationarity in the transaction 
price process. One can illustrate this in a theoretical model, as in Bossaerts [1995]. In 
the experiments, however, there may be an opportunity to see nonstationarity directly 
in action. 
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One likely type of nonstationarity that price adjustment could induce in transaction 
price changes is heteroscerlasticity. A look at Figure 1 confirms that there are periods 
of sudden increases in volatility (corresponding to the beginning of trading rounds with 
stochastic valuations), followed by a steady decay. This upsets the inference from the 
z-statistics in Tables 1 and 2: they are standard normally distributed only under ho­
moscedasti city. 
vVhat would be an appropriate z-st.atistic? The only restriction the null hypothesis 
imposes is Eqn. (1). In all other respects, generality should be aimed for. Hall [1977] de­
rived a result that could form the basis for alternative z-statistics. It states the following. 
Define: 
( 1 T ) 
Sr= vT T l:r1.r1.-1 . t=l 
Theorem 4.1 Assmn.c: (i) Eqn. (1), (ii)
(a Lindeberg condition), (iii) 
('T' T )2 
1. E [ t 1.-1 ] O mi " max ---
T-+oo 19.�T T 
in probability, with a> 0 ahno.'>t s·11.rcly, and (iv), a is measurable in :F0. Then:
S'1· - ""'N(O, 1).
(J 
(2) 
This is a typical martingak� central limit result in that it restricts the behavior of con­
ditional volatilities instead of the memory (mixing) of the process in order to generate 
asymptotic standard normality. Notice how general it is: a is not constrained to be 
constant across time series. The reader may be unfamiliar with martingale processes 
where the average conditional volatility is sample-dependent, so, let us assume for the 
time being that a is a constant. Only if the clata force us to reconsider this assumption 
will we do so. 
a is unknown, and, therefore, has to be estimated somehmv from the data. In other 
words, the implementability of Themem 4.1 depends crucially on whether one can for­
mulate a consistent estimator for a. Two strategies will be discussed next. 
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5 Implementation
Assuming that one has a cross-section of independent time series, there is a very simple 
estimator for a, namely the cross-sectional standard deviation of Sr. Let Sr( i) denote 
the value of Sr in the 'ith time series U = 1, .,. , N). Then: 
1 N 
(O-j� = NL (Sr(i))2 .i=l 
(3) 
a is really the asymptotic cross-scclionnl standard deviation of Sr. Provided the re­
alizations of Sr are independent in cross-section, the cross-sectional sample standard 
deviation ( 0-c) provides a consistent estimator.
The simplicity of the estimator in (3) has lead many to use it in event studies, where 
one has a cross-section of time series, namely the return pattern after the event being 
studied. If the time series are clustered in time, cross-sectional dependence could be 
reduced by a matched-sample technique, whereby appropriately matched non-event time 
series are subtracted from the return series at hand. For examples, see the event analyses 
of Patell and 'Nolfson [1984] and RitLer [1991 ], 
But there is an alternative, equa.lly simple estimator. Consider 
(4) 
0-ts is a consistent estimator of a under very weak conditions. To see this, write (O-ts)2 as 
the sum of a term that converges Lo a2· and the sample average of a martingale difference 
sequence: 
By assumption, the first term converges to a. The second term is the sample average of a 
martingale difference sequence. For the latter to converge to zero, it suffices that higher
moments of the elernents of tl1e rnartiugale difference sequence exist (a martingale law of
large numbers; see, e.g., \Vhite [I D8:3], p. 58), No further requirements are needed.
As a matter of fact, 0-ts is a very robust t�stimator of a. In particular, a could vary 
in cross-section. 0-c cannot possibly capture cross-sectional variation in a, and, hence, 
would be an inconsistent estinrntor in that case. \Ve shall come back to this point. 
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Let us first look at the experiment.al data and compute z-statistics on the basis of 0-c 
and 0-ts· Denote: 
Likewise: 
� -,...,c ,., • 
Sr 
Zt.s = -A-. 
<71.s 
(5) 
(6) 
Table 3 reports the z-stat.istics for the experiments. Only results from the disaggregated 
samples (control sample, adjustment sample) are displayed. The Ztshs (the z-statistics 
that requires homoscedasticity) are taken from Table 2. 
Several observations can immediately be made. First, notice the striking contrast 
between Ztsh, on the one hand, ancl Zc or z1.8, on the other hand, in the adjustment 
sample. No such discrepancy emerges for the control sample, indicating that non'"'event 
return series can even be taken to be homoscedastic. In the adjustment sample, both Zc 
and Zts lead to different inference compared to Ztsh· This illustrates how nonstationarity 
affects inference when there is price discovery. In other words, one cannot simply assume 
that the post-event adjustment series is stationary. 
Second, there are discrepancies even between Zc and Zt.s· Not only across experiments, 
but also in the overall x2-statistic. The latter is based on the following simple argument. 
Both Zc and Zts are standard normal (asymptoticaJly). The sum of uncorrelated squared 
standard normal random variables is x2 distributed, with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of terms in the sum. The x2-statistics in Table 3 are computed by taking the 
squares of the z-statistics and surnllling across experiments. Under the null, the result 
should be x2 distributed with five degrees of freedom (one can safely assume that there 
is independence acrnss- experi me1 its). 
The overall x2 rejects the null that. returns form a martingale difference sequence 
(Eqn. (1)) when based on z1.8, but not when based on Zc· The discrepancy is not marginal. 
Moreover, Zc and Zts do not aJ.t.ribute reject.ions to the same experiments. Zts, for instance, 
finds substantial positive se1fal co1n�l<ltion in experiment cpll2493, but Zc does not agree: 
zero autocorrelation cannot be reject.eel even at low levels of significance. 
6 Explaini-ng T·he Di-sci·epancies 
It is unlikely that Zts fails because il1.s is an inconsistent estimator of <J: this would occur 
only if higher moments of the return series do not exist. Zc, however, leads to correct 
inference only if <J does not changt� in cross-section. Zts does not require this. It is the 
appropriate estimator with which to implement Theorem 4.1 when <J is suspected of 
varying across time series. 
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It was already mentioned that Theorem 4.1 is very general, because a, the asymptotic 
time series average conditionaJ variance, may be a random variable. This contrasts with 
traditional martingale central limit theorems, where a remains constant across time series 
(see Brown [1971], IVIcLeish [1974]). Actually, the Theorem can also be described as an 
asymptotic mixtures-of-normals result, i.e., it. is a non.ergodic central limit theorem. In 
particular, one can write: 
where z is a standard normal random variable, mean-independent of a. The mean­
independence of z relative to er comes from the restriction in the Theorem that a be 
measurable in :F0. It. is crucial, as Example 3.3 in Hall [1974] illustrates. Loosely speaking, 
it means that there must not be correlation between the level of the conditional volatilities 
(actually, the time series average conditional volatility) and the (signed) return series 
(more precisely, the rescaled average of returns times past returns). 
Before citing evidence that er varies across experiments in the data, we should briefly 
discuss whether there are a 11riori reasons to believe that such would be the case in the 
context of price discovery. There are at least two reasons. As mentioned before, the 
process of price adjustment in n continuous market is essentially a learning process. In 
such a process, the evolution of the precision of the beliefs depend critically on the accu­
mulated evidence. Therefore, it, is path-dependent, or non.ergodic. The lack of ergodicity 
of the precision translates into path-dependence ( nonergodici ty) of the price adjustment 
process in general, and the conditional volatility in particular. A simple analytical ex­
ample can be found in Bossaerts [1995] (his "Case II"). Hence, the asymptotic average 
conditional volatility (a) will reflect this: it will be path-dependent. 
Another reason for the sample dependence of a comes from a game-theoretic analysis 
of the price discovery process. One way to model the price adjustment is to consider it 
to be a concatenation of barµ;ainiug games under asymmetric information (as in Wilson 
[1987]). \t\Te know that 111ultiplicity of' equilibria plague the analysis of such games, and, 
hence, that the price adjusCnwnt patli will he case-dependent. In other words, one 
expects to see heterogeneity across exp( �rirnents. In particular, the asymptotic average 
conditional volatility nrny vary. Theore111 4.1 allows this. 
At this point, I should commeut. on tlw way I organize the data, ·which is to concate­
nate transaction price changes from different trading rounds in an experiment into a single 
time series . .. W.J:1�r�i;ic.,t.-<.�e.:msicle1� each-t1�ad�ng-rom�d.as a.separ:ate price adjustment process, 
i.e., as a separate Liuie series? TlH� resulting tirne series would be of insufficient length.
to make reliable inference. T'lH� c:011rntenat.io11 Ceclmique has the added advantage that it 
effectively ccmsicll-!rs the ent.in-! experiment. to be a single, long price adjustment, consist­
ing of shorter price discovery subperiocls. Recent stat.istical analysis of game-theoretic 
experiments has found syst.ernatfr learning effects over entire experiments, even if this 
consisted of a sequence of independent subgames. Agents appear to extract information 
lO 
about the likely behavior of opponents, to be used in future, independent replications 
of the same game. See, e.g., ?vicl\elvey and Palfrey [1993) and El-Gamal, McKelvey 
and Palfrey [1994]. In other words, whereas the parameters may be independent across 
trading rounds of an experiment, beliefs, and, hence, the price discovery processes, are 
not.4 
There is evidence in the experimental claJ,a that a varies in cross-section. Table 3 
reports at8S. They vary substantially across experiments. Hence, sample dependence of 
a seems to be the reason why there is a discrepancy between the inference from Zc and 
Zts· 
Because of the cross-sectional variation of a, Zc is not a valid implementation of 
Theorem 4.1. In contrast., Zt.s would be, prnvicled the rescaled average return times
lagged return (5'r) is mean-independent of a. To ascertain whether this condition is
satisfied in the experimental data, one could regress Sr onto B-ts· An ordinary least
squares regression genernted the following results: 
ST = 8G.4 
(0.150) 
1.3 ats + f 
(-4.525) 
(7) 
(t-statistics in parentheses).ri There appears to be a significant negative relationship
between S'r and if ts:  strong negative serial correlation coincides with high volatility.
Because of errors-in-variables, the true dependence between S'r and a is likely to be even
more pronounced. 
Consequently, we cannot trust z1.s either. It is not a cmrect implementation of The­
orem 4.1. For valid inference, conditionaJ volatility and serial correlation must not be 
correlated. 
7 Con cl us ion
\i\Then testing the simple martingah� difference hypothesis in Eqn. (1) in the context 
of price discovery, one should be careful about nonstationarity and nonergodicity in 
transaction price changes. The experimental data from continuous double auctions with 
stochastic private valuations amply illustrate this. Lack of stationarity and even ergodic­
ity affect these data to the point. LhaL none of the traditional test strategies are valid. In 
4In a previous dra ft , 1 reported r<�sults fro111 tests on the alternative organization of the data, whereby
each trading round in an experimcmt is c:o11sidered to be a separate time series. Computing the corre­
sponding zcs for each experiment reveal8 absol11Lnly 110 evidence of serial correlation in transaction price 
changes, not even in tlie adjusl111c�11t sample� . 
5The estimates are based ou a pooli11g of' the adjusLrneut and control samples; the results do not alter 
qualitatively when c:onsidering 011ly tl1e adj11stu1eut sarnple 
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other words, the f,nuWional z-strdistics do not generate conclusive evidence as to whether 
the fairly substantial sc·rial correlation in the transaction prices is significant. 
Is there a way to make valid inference in nonstationary, nonergodic series? In general, 
the answer is negative. It appears that test statistics and their properties have to be 
developed in the context of a particular model of price adj11stment. The asymptotics on 
which the inference in based are likely to be nonstandard. An example can be found 
in Bossaerts [1995], where the asymptotic distribution of simple z-stafistics is derived 
for two particular price adjustment models. Both cases generate asymptotic laws that 
involve functionals of Brownian motions. 
There is a negative rdaLionship bet.ween serial correlation and average conditional 
volatility in the second nwdd of Bossa(�rLs [1995]. The same relationship is present in 
the experimental data and lead us to conclude that Pat.ell's statistic cannot be used as a 
basis for inference, despite its obvious advantages.
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Table 1 
Serial correlation properties of intra-trading-round transaction prices 
in five experim ents 
Experi men L (J Ztsh T 
cp032204 -.397 -6.861 ** 298 
cp032394 -.419 -7.972** 362 
cpll0193 -.522 -8.638** 274 
cpll2493 -.253 -4.534** 322 
cp120893 -.483 -9.471 ** 384 
Rem arks: p denotes the first-order autoc01Telation coefficient of transaction price changes; 
Ztsh is the corresponding z-statistic, obtaiuecl by multiplying p by the square root of the 
sample size; T is the sample size. ** denotes significance at the 1 % level. 
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Table 2 
Serial correlation properties of intra-trading-round accepted asks in five 
experim ents 
Total Sample Adjustment Sample Control Sample 
Experiment p Zt.sh p Zt.sh T p Ztsh T 
cp032294 -.204 -3.672 ** -.297 -2.987 ** 101 -.117 -0.867 55 
cp032394 -.165 -1.140 -.200 -1.058 28 .055 0.247 20 
cpll0193 -.623 -8.363 ** -.624 -7.169 ** 132 -.114 -0.789 48 
cp112493 .260 2.883 ** .289 2.539 ** 77 .053 0.359 46 
cp120893 -.429 -G.892 ** -.430 -5.585 ** 169 -.443 -4.181 ** 89 
Rem arks: p denotes the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of transaction price changes; 
Ztsh is the corresponding ::-statistic, obtained by multiplying p by the square root of the 
sample size; T is the sample size. *' denotes significance at the 1 % level. 
lG 
Table 3 
Serial correlation properties of intra-trading-round accepted asks 
in five experirnents: evidence adjusted for nonstationarity 
Adjustment Sample Control Sample 
Experiment Ztsh �c Zt.s Cfts Ztsh Zc Zts 
cp032294 -2.987 ** -1.048 -0.842 4538.l -0.867 -0.148 -0.628 
cp032394 -1.058 -0.2G5 -0.057 1008.2 0.247 0.206 0.381 
cpll0193 -7.169 ** -2.038 * -2.340 ** 3176.7 -0.789 -0.012 -0.756 
cpll2493 2.539 ** 0.172 2.538 ** 246.9 0.359 0.082 0.316 
cpl20893 -5.585 ** -0.8G4 -1.210 2604.0 -4.181 ** -2.229 * -1.574 
x2 99.2 ** G.l 15.0 ** 19.1 ** 5.0 3.6 
Rem arks: Ztsh tests for serial correlation of a homoscedastic series. Zc tests for serial 
correlation of a nonstationa.ry series. :::18 t.ests for serial correlation of a nonstationary, 
nonergoclic series. x2 is obt<lined by squaring z-statistics and summing across rows. * 
and ** denote significance at. the 5% and I% level, respectively. 
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F igure 1: Transaction price changes against transaction time for experiment cpll0193. 
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